Showing posts with label mortgages. Show all posts
Showing posts with label mortgages. Show all posts

Sunday, January 30, 2011

Household Credit Expansion in Canada

This post will look at the household credit in Canada and it's contribution to economic activity. The link between the two has been a common theme of blogs such as AmericaCanada and Financial Insights for awhile and is recently becoming mainstream. The idea boils down to this:

Point 1. Credit has been growing at an unsustainable rate
Point 2. This has artificially inflated the entire economy
Point 3. Once credit contracts this artificial activity will disappear

This has been used to explain the difference between Canada and U.S. economic trajectories; Credit is contracting in the U.S. while still expanding in Canada. I do agree that credit growth has been unsustainable but not to the same extent as others. Consider the following from Financial Insights:
Let’s not forget that line of credit growth, particularly HELOCs, have significantly boosted consumer spending. CAAMP data suggests that home equity extraction alone has added 9% to the after tax income of the average family’s budget. When this slows, consumer spending (65% of our economy) slows with it. The new mortgage rules aimed at limiting home equity withdrawals will certainly act as a catalyst to strengthen this trend.
The explanation of this 9% is in a previous post.
Let me reiterate some basic math: If 18% of all households with mortgages (~60% of total) have withdrawn equity in the past 12 months, and the average amount was $46K, that means that when averaged across all households, it would be equal to over $5,400 in additional household spending per household in the past 12 months. Given that the median after tax income of Canadian households was most recently calculated at $63,900, this equity extraction has ‘boosted’ income and spending by an additional 8.5%.
No actual payments are considered in the above calculations. While many are taking withdrawals there are also households with who have made regular or lump sump principal payments over the past year. Some HELOCs may have been taken to pay others down. I think it would have been more suitable to look at aggregate HELOC growth to determine it's impact on consumer spending. I would guess this number is less than the 9% calculated here.

Also, there is some amount of household credit growth which could be sustained. Theoretically, credit could grow at a sustainable 4% with 1% from population growth and 3% from rising wages.

So I agree with point 1 in the model is true but to a lesser degree. What does this mean for the entire economy? Lets consider point 2 that above trend credit growth has boosted the entire economy. Consider a hypothetical couple, John and Jane Smith, and their consumption without credit expansion. They can only use the income to buy goods and services.
  • Debtor Income: $50,000
  • Debtor Consumption: $50,000
Since these people are impatient, shallow and reckless with money (like most Canadians are) they take a credit line against their house to "purchase" a new vehicle. They also buy granite counter tops and a Blackberry they otherwise would not have if the funds were unavailable.
  • Debtor Income: $50,000
  • HELOC Withdrawl: $50,000
  • Debtor Consumption: $100,000
Once the bills come due income is diverted away from purchasing goods and services.
  • Debtor Income: $50,000
  • HELOC Repayment: $25,000
  • Debtor Consumption: $25,000
If this happens to the balance sheets of household on masse the implications are clear. From Financial Insights:
I suspect the true state of the economy will become evident as credit demand dwindles and home prices normalize.
This example shows credit expansion as an outside entity artificially boosting economic activity. During the austerity phase debt repayments disappear into this abyss and cause widespread pain. The missing element here is that each loan has both a debtor and a creditor. It is not like debt repayments are sent to an inferno somewhere and disappear from the economy forever. First look at the creditors and debtors consumption before a reckless loan is made.
  • Creditor Income: $300,000
  • Debtors Income: $50,000
  • Creditor Consumption: $300,000
  • Debtors Consumption: $50,000
  • Total Consumption: $350,000
With the loan the Smiths spends an amount greater than their income but this is offset by the creditor's increased savings.
  • Creditor Consumption: $250,000
  • Debtors Consumption: $100,000
  • Total Consumption: $350,000
In this case it is theoretically possible that during the repayment phase there is no drop in total demand. Instead consumption is shifted from the debtor to the creditor.
  • Creditor Consumption: $325,000
  • Debtors Consumption: $25,000
  • Total Consumption: $350,000
The Blackberry, the granite counter tops and the new car the Smiths bought are all real. The debt played no part in their actual design, production or distribution. So the economy was not operating at a level higher than it's capacity which has been implied.

While I disagree that the economy was ever above a true state there still are downside risks. If the loans are not sound then this can cause shocks which will reduce activity below capacity. Hence the high unemployment rate in the United States right now. The economy will likely have to adjust from the middle class using debt to finance their lifestyles. So the model would differ somewhat:

Point 1. Household credit has been growing at an unsustainable rate
Point 2. The transition to sustained credit growth could trigger a period of time where economic activity is below capacity

And that's good news! After the economic shock subsides, John and Jane Smith will be given the privilege of toiling well into the future to fund the consumption of their creditors.

Saturday, October 23, 2010

Lenders Behaving Badly

Something to consider about fixed rate loans. Penalties.

The fact they exist isn't what is troubling. It is a problem when the penalty is arbitrary and unnecessarily complicated. The Globe and Mail discusses how lenders select an unrelated interest rate (the posted rate) when doing interest rate differential calculations, which end up favoring the lender.

....

Here comes the evil part.

At many big banks, they don’t use your existing 4.75-per-cent rate. What they do is take the posted rate at the time you took out your mortgage. This is a rate that has no relevance to you, as you never paid it. In fact, it likely isn’t listed anywhere on your mortgage contract. Remember the ridiculously high mortgage rate we talked about at the beginning of this article? Now you see what it can be used for.

....

Because of this sleight of hand, you would now owe the bank an additional $12,000!
The federal government was going to announce some regulation regarding mortgage penalties but has failed to do so. Reducing onerous mortgage penalties will reduce future foreclosures at the margin, which in addition to consumer protection should be the goal of regulation - not controlling asset prices.

The Canadian Mortgage Trends blog recently wrote about some lesser know potential costs of borrowing. I don't have comment for each individual item, but when compiled into a list it seems the industry benefits themselves through technicalities and obfuscation.
  • Restrictions on breaking your mortgage before the term is up
  • Restrictions on breaking your mortgage for the first 3 years
  • A penalty surcharge of 1% for mortgages broken within the first 12 or 36 months
  • “Reinvestment fees” (on top of mortgage penalties)
  • Interest rate differential (IRD) penalties based on an onerous bond yield calculation
  • IRD penalties on variable-rate mortgages (usually IRD penalties apply to fixed mortgages)
  • IRD penalties based on a costly posted vs. discounted rate formula
  • Inability to port unless the purchase and sale take place on the exact same day (which can be hard to arrange)
  • A poor conversion rate guarantee
  • No refinances during the first year
  • No free switches (for transfer-eligible mortgages)
  • Amortization limits of 25 years
  • Minimum amortizations of 15-18 years
  • Restrictions on converting from a variable rate to a fixed rate for the first six months
  • No ability to break your “open” HELOC without a penalty
  • No pre-payments within 30 days of discharge
  • Inability to port across provincial lines
  • High administrative fees when porting
  • 100% clawback of cash-back if the mortgage is broken before maturity
  • Requirement for a full banking relationship with the lender
  • No lump-sum pre-payment privileges
  • No annual payment increase allowance
  • Pre-payments restricted to one specific day a year (instead of any payment date)
A lot of the fees are related to breaking the mortgage, which can occur simply by selling the house. With this in mind some thing that can mitigate these risks.

  • Borrow below your limit which reduces the chance of a forced sale during financial stress.
  • Keep amortization periods as short as possible to avoid dealing with these fees for 25-40 years!
  • Only buy if you seriously plan to stay in the house for awhile (5+ years)
  • Avoid gimmick mortgages like the so-called "cash back"

Sunday, May 23, 2010

Easy money for Canadian Lenders

This post will take a look at some ways banks and lenders are taking in some easy money in Canada.

1. The 5-year fixed corral

Right now there is a fairly hefty premium built into 5-year fixed mortgages and with the new qualifying rules it is the only option available to marginal buyers. If buyers choose a variable mortgage or a short fixed term they have to qualify for the posted 5-year rate. This rate now appears to be arbitrarily high compared to 5-year government bonds and this will move buyers towards fixed mortgages.

Even the spread on the discount rates appears elevated. Lenders are moving marginal buyers into fixed rate mortgages and collecting wider margins for it.

See the chart below to compare the fixed 5-year mortgage to the 5-year government bond. Before the financial crisis (2000-2006) the posted mortgage averaged 2.42% higher than the benchmark bond. The premium has been above 3% for about a month.



Read the article from Canadian Mortgage Trends about this situation.

It makes one curious about the logic that went into the final decision. Is there a real threat of sustained 4.35%+ higher rates? Or did the powers that be set the bar overly high to herd people into 5-year fixed mortgages—which just happen to be more profitable?

Maybe the latter is just too cynical a thought…

My opinion is that the restrictions to variable mortgages is a good thing and should be applied to discount 5-year fixed mortgages to avoid this problem.

2. Prime rate premium remains elevated well after financial crisis subsides.

Must be nice to collect an additional 0.25% off indebted Canadians, which the banks are doing since the prime rate remains inflated long after the financial crisis faded away. Normally the prime rate tracked the Bank of Canada's overnight target rate with a 1.75% premium. However back in 2008 they decided to withhold part of the central bank's rate cut. See article: Canadian consumers shortchanged on rate cut.

"Continuing market turmoil has steadily driven up the cost of borrowing for financial institutions. This makes it challenging to match the Bank of Canada rate cut at this time,"

Tim Hockey, president and chief executive of Toronto-Dominion Bank, said.

TORONTO - Toronto-Dominion Bank (TSX:TD) continued a string of big-profit announcements from Canada's largest banks Thursday, posting first-quarter results that handily blew away analyst estimates for both earnings and revenue.

The bank's net income rose to $1.3 billion in the quarter, essentially doubling the $653 million it earned a year earlier, helped by record earnings from its domestic banking operations.

It joined CIBC (TSX:CM) and Bank of Montreal (TSX:BMO) in beating Bay Street estimates, with only Royal Bank (TSX:RY) falling slightly short of expectations even as it posted a $1.5-billion profit.

To illustrate this additional 0.25% premium see the chart below with the BOC rate, prime rate and difference between them. There were the occasional spikes resulting from a small delay to move the prime rate, but this is the first sustained difference going back 10 years.



3. The renewal trap.

Canadian mortgages are typically renewed every 5 years or less. With the recent mortgage changes to decrease amortization from 40 to 35 years, require 5% down and qualify on 5-year posted rate (not to mention future price decreases) there will be borrowers who fail to qualify at renewal. Since a change in lender requires requalification while renewal does not, borrowers have no choice but to renew at the rate given to them. Good deal for lenders who can set price arbitrarily. Another unintended consequence of loose lending. Again, from Canadian Mortgage Trends:
The kicker is that you can’t change lenders at renewal without requalifying. Therefore, if you don’t have 20% equity at maturity you could be stuck in another 5-year fixed mortgage (possibly at your existing lender’s “rack rate”). If you instead want to switch to a variable or 1-4 year fixed term, your debt ratios will have to fit under the much stricter government guidelines at that time.

Tuesday, February 16, 2010

New Rules


Flaherty has announced new mortgage rules to take effect by April 19th to "help negative trends from developing". From the Deparement of Finance website:

  • Require that all borrowers meet the standards for a five-year fixed rate mortgage even if they choose a mortgage with a lower interest rate and shorter term. This initiative will help Canadians prepare for higher interest rates in the future.
  • Lower the maximum amount Canadians can withdraw in refinancing their mortgages to 90 per cent from 95 per cent of the value of their homes. This will help ensure home ownership is a more effective way to save.
  • Require a minimum down payment of 20 per cent for government-backed mortgage insurance on non-owner-occupied properties purchased for speculation.
5-year fixed mortgages are still under 4% so the preparation for future rate increases is minor. I hope this doesn't give the any buyers a false sense that qualifying for the 5-year fixed makes their mortgage safe from potential rate hikes - I think using the 3x income rule as a more reasonable measure.

Absent was a decrease in amortization and increase in down payment. I have previous posts discussing why shorter amortizations and larger downpayments are important. The previous two posts were regarding 0 down/40 year mortgages but the same principles applies to 5/35 mortgages as well. CMHC fees are reduced for each additional 5% down (up to 20%) and total interest costs are reduced as amortization is shortened.

Saturday, November 21, 2009

The bubble model

The bubble model for home buyers in Alberta goes something like this:

A reckless financial illiterate buying simply for capital appreciation using the loan which allows for the minimum monthly payment.

For example this is from Garth Turners blog about how to tell you are in a housing bubble:
When the number of people taking 35-year amortizations explodes higher. Overall, these loans have doubled as a percentage of all mortgages in two years but that does not tell the true story, since today 5/35 buyers constitute an absolute majority of new originations. Of course, 35-year borrowers pay off virtually no principle for years and years which makes this akin to renting money. No equity means no ability to withstand a market correction.
From this mortgage market report 53% of new purchases are for amortizations 25 years or less. 29% are for 35 years or greater.

Another snippet from Garth's same post.
Some observers, bless their good hearts and large stones, had the courage to warn recent buyers with mortgages in the 2-3% range they could be in deep financial trouble before too long. But you know that. The reasons why have been beaten to death on this blog already.
To be fair in this case he didn't say that 2-3% variable rate mortgages are the norm. But going back to the mortgage report 5-year fixed mortgages are the most popular.

-73% of mortgages held by 18-34 year olds have terms greater than 4 years.
-71% of mortgages held by 18-34 year olds have fixed rates, 9% combination

Of new mortgages within the last 12 months shorter terms do appear more popular, but not the majority. 56% have terms greater than 4 years.

Of course there are a significant number of mortgages over 30 years at a variable rate and these will most likely cause some amount of turbulence during the next leg down. The model that typical Canadian buyers have been recklessly overbidding $300,000 for a shacks in downtown Toronto or Vancouver using a 35 year VRM makes for good entertainment but does not reflect reality.

Wednesday, October 31, 2007

I became a landlord thanks to the CMHC!

I'm like totally a savvy investor! All i had to do was pick a crib and post the goods on the craiglists. CMHC hooked me up with the money stash.

I gots me some deposit and the rents right away. I just can't wait until the "equity" starts rolling in.

The ladies dig it when I tell them about my bizness. Sweeeeeeet!

Wednesday, October 24, 2007

CMHC opens up the money spigot

CMHC just introduced 100% financing for 1 and 2 unit rental properties. Also 90% financing for 3-4 unit properties. See product announcement

What is amazing about this loan insurance is the premium they charge- 7.25% for 100% financing. This will get tacked onto the loan amount so in essence you are borrowing 107.25%. This is available in combination with other products such as 40-year amortization, self-employed and new to Canada programs.

Lets assume an investor took a 100% loan amortized over 40 years for a full duplex costing 500K. Adding the 7.25% premium of $36,250 the investor takes a loan for 536,250. Using an amortization table it would take over 10 years just to pay the premium! I assumed an interest rate of 7% and first payment Jan 2008.

Year Loan Balance Yearly Interest Paid Yearly Principal Paid Total Interest
2008 533,718.19 37,457.29 2,531.81 37,457.29
2009 531,003.36 37,274.27 2,714.83 74,731.57
2010 528,092.27 37,078.01 2,911.09 111,809.58
2011 524,970.74 36,867.57 3,121.53 148,677.15
2012 521,623.55 36,641.92 3,347.19 185,319.07
2013 518,034.40 36,399.95 3,589.16 221,719.02
2014 514,185.78 36,140.49 3,848.62 257,859.50
2015 510,058.95 35,862.27 4,126.83 293,721.77
2016 505,633.79 35,563.94 4,425.16 329,285.72
2017 500,888.73 35,244.05 4,745.06 364,529.76
2018 495,800.66 34,901.03 5,088.08 399,430.79

The funny thing is the renters of this property would be expected to pay security deposit and one months rent to a landlord with absolutely no stake whatsoever.